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<text> <title> Tribalism and South African Violence </title> <article> <hdr> Foreign Broadcast Information Service, May 9, 1991 South Africa: Tribalism Said 'Important Element' in Violence </hdr> <body> [Article by Patrick Laurence: "Ethnic Thread in Tangled Fabric." Johannesburg THE STAR in English 7 May 91 p 14] [Text] Zulus are attacked "just because they are Zulu people," Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP] leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi declares of the latest violence in Soweto. It is a matter of ongoing and even acrimonious debate whether Chief Buthelezi is sombrely warning his tribal kinsmen on the reality of anti-Zulu hostility, or whether he is expediently trying to drive Zulus into the IFP. Either way his accusation against African national Congress [ANC] forces underlines once again that there is an ineradicable tribal dimension to the fighting. Yet there is a curious reluctance in radical and even liberal circles to recognise the power of tribalism or, to use a more respectable term, ethno-tribalism, as a factor in the intra-black conflict. Tribalism, like apartheid, is a dirty word in South Africa. Tribalist is a label of abuse, used to hang around the necks of political foes or rival political organisations. It is associated with bigotry and often serves as a synonym for collaborator. The link between apartheid and tribalism has been built up over more than four decades. The legacy of apartheid lives on in the midst of President de Klerk's attempts to discard the past and excise racist laws from the statute book. He has reserved--or wants to reserve--places at the negotiating table for leaders of the 10 black "nation states" recognised under the Bantu Self Government Act, an archetypical apartheid law. His strategy is seen by supratribal movements, primarily the African National Congress, as a shrewd manoeuvre to deploy tribalism to weaken their influence. Thus when tribalism surfaces in the political arena, it is seen as the product of sinister divide-and-rule machinations by Mr de Klerk's security forces. Marxist theory, with its emphasis on class interests, is often used to explain tribalism away or, at least, to downplay it. Marxism, influencing the ANC's ideological outlook via its alliance partner, the South African Communist Party, blurs reality. The reluctance to comprehend fully the failure of the socialist economic system is matched by disinclination to recognise the power of ethnicity. The rise of ethnically based nationalisms in the Baltic states and the prevalence of inter-ethnic conflict in vast areas of the Soviet Union, is often glossed over. Closer to home, the intra-black violence which has swept through black townships around Johannesburg since August last year, claiming at least 1,000 lives, is not regarded as intrinsically tribal; it is perceived as the product of a sinister strategy by a state-linked "third force" aimed at weakening the ANC. An ANC discussion paper on the violence draws attention to the calculated revival of tribally based political parties in the "homelands" as the prospect of all-party talks on a new constitution becomes more tangible. But the conflict in townships around Johannesburg has an unmistakable tribal colouring. At its blood-strained cutting edge, it has pitted Zulu migrant workers, proclaiming loyalty to the IFP, against Xhosa-speaking people. Men have been slain because of their tribal affinity. Ideological loyalty has been immaterial. Tribal tensions are unfortunately and perhaps ineluctably fuelled by structural factors. The IFP started life as a specifically Zulu movement but has since undergone two important changes: first it opened its ranks to all blacks and then, only last year, it invited people of all races to join. But even after its latest metamorphosis Inkatha remains--for the time being, at any rate--a predominantly Zulu organisation. The ANC is a supra-tribal organisation with a long and proud record of non-racialism. But most of its important national posts are occupied by Xhosas. Its president, deputy president, secretary-general, international affairs supremo and information chief are all Xhosas. So, too, is the chief of staff of its underground army, Chris Hani. Its effective leader and deputy president, Nelson Mandela, is a member of a royal Xhosa family. The two strongest contenders to succeed him are Xhosas, Mr Hani and Thabo Mbeki. Xhosa pre-eminence in the ANC's top leadership is matched by the small number of Zulus in its upper ranks. One of the few prominent Zulus on the ANC national executive is Jacob Zuma, the ANC intelligence chief. The imbalance--the more than 6 million Zulus constitute the biggest ethnic group in South Africa--explains why some Zulus are suspicious of the ANC as "a Xhosa organisation." The ethnic skewing of Inkatha generally and the ANC at leadership level means that Inkatha-ANC rivalry tends all too easily to degenerate into inter-tribal animosity. Rhetorical statements occasionally resonate with tribal undertones or even overtones. Thus, where the ANC has specifically demanded the dissolution of the KwaZulu "bantustan", it has a cosy relationship with the leader of the Xhosa "bantustan", Transkei's General Bantu Holomisa. The contrast has been noted by Inkatha leaders and interpreted as evidence of tribal bias against the Zulu people. In moments of stress Chief Buthelezi has deployed the language of tribalism. Thus he had accused the ANC-aligned Congress of Traditional Leaders of being a "spear thrust into the heart of the Zulu nation". But it is as misleading to magnify tribalism as it is to deny its existence. Tribalism or ethno-nationalism is an important element in the conflict, one which may be particularly amenable to manipulation by the security forces. But, in the end, it is only one of several factors in a complex political equation. In Natal the savage conflict between ANC-aligned forces and Inkatha loyalists has been intra-Zulu. The divide has been ideological, not tribal. In the Transvaal there has been a class factor in the conflict. The Zulu fighters with their distinctive red bandanas, have been drawn largely from the ranks of migrant workers living in the hostels. Armed with their "traditional weapons", they have fought savage battles while some of their Zulu kinsmen, living permanently in the townships, have either been neutral or have even sided with ANC forces. After the ANC's national conference in July, and the infusion of "new blood" from the men who manned the front ranks of the United Democratic Front during the 1980s, the ANC will almost certainly reflect a more balances ethnic mix. Inkatha, too, is broadening its ethnic and racial base and, according to its spokesmen, is now recruiting Xhosas in the eastern Cape, Tswana in the western Transvaal and whites all over South Africa. </body> </article> </text>